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Abstract
This paper considers the Ricardian Equivalence proposition when
expectations are not rational and are instead formed using adaptive
learning rules. We show that Ricardian Equivalence continues to hold
provided suitable additional conditions on learning dynamics are satis-
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must not depend on government’s financial variables under deficit fi-
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1 Introduction
One of the most prominent theories in macroeconomics is the Ricardian
Equivalence proposition that if taxes are non-distortionary then the mix of
tax and debt financing of government purchases is irrelevant in the sense
that there is no impact on the equilibrium sequence of key real variables.
The proposition is easily understood in the context of the “Ramsey model”
in which infinitely-lived representative agents solve dynamic optimization
problems and have rational expectations about the future course of the econ-
omy. The extension by Barro (1974) to an overlapping generations model
with finitely-lived agents, who make bequests to their children, showed that
Ricardian Equivalence holds more generally than one might think. At the
same time it is widely understood that Ricardian Equivalence does not gen-
erally hold if agents are not dynamic optimizers (e.g. if agents choose current
consumption on the basis of current disposable income), if households are liq-
uidity constrained, if taxes are distortionary, or if government spending is not
exogenous to financing. These and other reasons for failure of the Ricardian
proposition have been examined in the voluminous theoretical and empirical
literature on Ricardian Equivalence. For further discussion and references
see the survey papers by Bernheim (1987), Barro (1989), Seater (1993), and
Ricciuti (2003).
An apparently key assumption that has not been examined in detail is the
role of rational expectations (RE).1 Although the development of microfoun-
dations in macroeconomics went hand in hand with RE during the 1970s and
most of the 1980s, the RE hypothesis has been subject to the criticism that it
makes very strong assumptions about the information and knowledge agents
are assumed to have. A substantial recent literature has emphasized the
importance of learning dynamics arising from boundedly rational deviations
from RE due to imperfect knowledge of the economy.2 For example, applica-
tions to monetary policy design include Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) and Preston (2005). This approach has also been used
1Some papers have argued that uncertainties and misperceptions about future taxes,
government spending and public debt lead to failure of the Ricardian proposition. See
Feldstein (1982) and Seater (1993). More recently, Eusepi and Preston (2010b) have
examined related issues under learning in a New Keynesian set-up, but the validity of
Ricardian Equivalence is not their central focus. For further discussion see Section 4.4.
2For the learning approach see, for example, the overviews by Evans and Honkapohja
(2009), Sargent (2008), Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and Sargent (1993).
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in empirical analysis of macroeconomic policy, e.g. see Cogley and Sargent
(2005), Bullard and Eusepi (2005), Orphanides and Williams (2005), Prim-
iceri (2006), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006), Orphanides and Williams
(2007), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2009) and Eusepi and Preston (2010a).
This viewpoint raises the question, which is the focus of the current pa-
per: if expectations are not fully rational because, for example, they are made
using adaptive (or statistical) learning rules, will Ricardian Equivalence still
hold? Will it at least approximately hold if expectations are approximately
rational? Our answer to this question is striking: Ricardian Equivalence
holds under the usual conditions but without the requirement that expec-
tations be close to RE. If agents are dynamic optimizers, the logic behind
the Ricardian Equivalence proposition goes through even when agents have
non-rational forecasts, provided expectations are based on a natural informa-
tion set and provided agents understand the government’s budget constraint.
Thus whether or not Ricardian Equivalence holds does not hinge, per se, on
whether expectations are rational.
The first task of the paper is devoted to demonstrating Ricardian Equiv-
alence, in a world without RE, and to illustrating our results. We employ the
Ramsey model, a standard macroeconomic setting for demonstrating the Ri-
cardian Equivalence proposition,3 because it allows us to study the potential
impact of expectations on capital and output over time. We show that under
suitable adaptive learning rules, the time paths of variables are invariant to
the government financing decision, even if these paths are far from the RE
paths. However, the assumptions we make are crucial, and in the remainder
of the paper we show how failures of Ricardian Equivalence can arise when
these assumptions are not met.
Two issues are of particular interest. When expectations are not fully
rational, the issue of how the government budget is balanced out of the RE
equilibrium is delicate: oﬀ the RE equilibrium path there will be disequi-
librium budget surpluses or deficits. We show that if these oﬀ-equilibrium
deficits are reconciled partly by changes in government purchases rather than
lump-sum taxes, then this leads to a violation of Ricardian Equivalence. The
second issue concerns the information set that agents use to make interest
rate and wage forecasts. Under adaptive learning, if these forecasts are al-
lowed to depend in part on the history of debt or taxes, then Ricardian
Equivalence can fail along paths of temporary equilibria.
3For example, see Chapter 11 in the textbook by Romer (2001).
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2 The Model
We consider the standard discrete-time non-stochastic representative-agent
Ramsey model with government bonds. In this context, since there are no
intrinsic random shocks, RE reduces to perfect foresight. We replace perfect
foresight with the assumption that expectations are formed using an adaptive
learning mechanism. In the current section we take expectations as given and
study the “temporary” equilibrium at a moment in time. Then in Section 3,
we examine the paths of temporary equilibria with learning.
Assuming that agents are dynamic optimizers is a key assumption for our
results:
Assumption 1: Households choose ct to maximize their intertemporal
expected discounted utility, for given expectations about the future path of
real interest rates, wages, and taxes.
There are a large number of identical households. At each time t the
household maximizes their utility subject to a flow budget constraint:
max E∗t {
∞X
s=t
βs−t c
1−σ
s
1− σ} subject to (1)
as+1 = ws + rsas − cs − τ s, for all s ≥ t,
for given at and for given wt, rt and τ t. We assume σ > 0 and 0 < β < 1.
The variables cs, τ s, ws are consumption, taxes and the real wage rate in
period s, and rs is the gross real rate of return paid on both capital and
government one-period bonds determined at the beginning of period s. By
arbitrage, the government is assumed to promise the same rate of return on
one-period bonds as on private capital.4 Here as ≡ ks + bs, is per capita
household wealth and equals holdings of capital ks plus government debt
bs. The variables ws, rs and τ s are considered exogenous to the household.
Labor supply is normalized to be equal to 1, and the household is subject to
a No Ponzi Game condition.
Finally, E∗t denotes potentially subjective expectations at time t for the
future, which agents hold in the absence of perfect foresight. We assume
4An alternative approach, which would not change our results, is to assume that the
common rate of return rt+1 on capital and government debt is determined at time t
simultaneously with consumption ct. In this case, consumption depends on actual rt+1
(which depends on kt+1, which in turn is determined in period t) and on expected future
interest rates and wages.
4
that these expectations can be represented as point expectations, i.e. the
decisions of agents are assumed to be governed by themeans of the subjective
distribution of each variable. This “certainty equivalence” assumption, made
primarily for analytical convenience, will be a good approximation if either
the degree of subjective uncertainty is small (which may be more plausible in
our nonstochastic setting) or the model is approximately linear (as typically
assumed in macroeconomic models). The point expectations assumption has
a long tradition — see, for example, Grandmont (1998) and the references
therein.
The Euler equation for consumption is
c−σt = βE∗t (rt+1c−σt+1). (2)
With point expectations, from equation (2) one obtains
ct = β−
1
σ
¡
ret+1(t)
¢− 1σ cet+1(t), (3)
where cet+1(t) is short-hand notation for E∗t ct+1. Forward substitution of (3)
gives
cet+j(t) = ctβ
j
σ (
jY
i=1
ret+i(t))
1
σ ≡ ctβ
j
σ (Det,t+j(t))
1
σ . (4)
Here ret+i(t) refers to expectations of the interest rate rt+i formed at time t,
i.e., E∗t rt+i, and Det,t+j(t) denotes the expectations of the interest rate factor
Dt,t+j formed at time t, defined as
Det,t+j(t) =
jQ
i=1
ret+i(t), j ≥ 1. (5)
Let τ et+j(t) and aet+j(t) denote the expected lump-sum tax and net assets in
period t+ j forecasted at time t. The household plans must also satisfy the
transversality condition
lim
T→∞
(Det,t+T−1(t))−1aet+T (t) = 0. (6)
Using forward substitution in the flow household budget constraint and
equation (6) yields the intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer,
0 = rtat +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))−1(wet+j(t)− cet+j(t)− τ et+j(t)) + wt − ct − τ t,
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for given expectations
©
ret+j(t)
ª
,
©
wet+j(t)
ª
,
©
τ et+j(t)
ª
. Substituting in the
iterated Euler equation (4), one gets the consumption function
ct(1 + SeD(t)) = rtat + wt − τ t +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))−1(wet+j(t)− τ et+j(t)), (7)
where
SeD(t) ≡
∞X
j=1
βj/σ(Det,t+j(t))σ
−1−1,
which shows that consumption depends on expectations of future interest
rates and wages. The role of the path of the expected interest rates and
wages, in the absence of perfect foresight, in determining consumption in
the Ramsey model has been recognized for some time. See for example,
Blanchard and Fischer (1989), pp. 51-52. As emphasized in the learning
literature, perfect foresight is implausible except as an outcome of a learning
process.
We can rewrite the consumption function as
ct(1 + SeD(t)) = rtat + PV et (w)− PV et (τ), (8)
where the present value expressions
PV et (w) = wt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))−1wet+j(t) and
PV et (τ) = τ t +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))−1τ et+j(t)
are assumed to be finite.5
The consumption function (8), obtained from Assumption 1 using the
point expectations assumption, follows the “infinite-horizon” approach of the
learning literature adopted, for example, by Preston (2005). In the learning
literature an alternative approach often followed is based on “Euler-equation”
learning, see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Ch. 10, Bullard and Mitra
(2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003). On the latter approach agents
forecast one period in advance and use (3) as a decision rule. In the current
5Throughout the paper, we assume all relevant expected present value sums are finite.
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paper we follow the infinite-horizon approach precisely because the short-
horizon Euler-equation approach does not allow agents to anticipate explicitly
the implications of future fiscal actions; see Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra
(2009) for a fuller discussion.
We now turn to the production side of the Ramsey model, which is stan-
dard. The production function in intensive form is given by yt = f(kt),
where Yt is output, Kt is capital, Lt is labour, kt = Kt/Lt, yt = Yt/Lt, and
f(k) ≡ F (k, 1); F (K,L) being the underlying production function with con-
stant returns to scale. The Cobb-Douglas form f(k) = kα is assumed below
in the examples. For simplicity, there is neither population nor productivity
growth. 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 denotes the proportional rate of depreciation of the cap-
ital stock. Profit maximization by firms entails that the real wage rate wt
and the gross interest rate rt satisfy6
wt = f(kt)− ktf 0(kt), (9)
rt = 1− δ + f 0(kt). (10)
The government’s flow budget constraint is
bt+1 + τ t = gt + rtbt, (11)
where gt is government purchases of the good. Market clearing determines
kt+1 from
kt+1 = f(kt)− ct − gt + (1− δ)kt. (12)
Given pre-determined variables kt, bt, current fiscal policy variables gt, τ t, and
expectations
©
ret+j(t)
ª∞
j=1 ,
©
wet+j(t)
ª∞
j=1 ,
©
τ et+j(t)
ª∞
j=1 , a temporary equilib-
rium at time t is defined by the consumption function (8), the wage rate (9),
the interest rate (10), the government budget constraint (11), and market
clearing (12).
Next, we show that the consumption function can be written in terms of
the present value of labor income PV et (w) and of government spending
PV et (g) = gt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))−1get+j(t).
6Note that firms face a static problem, so that there is no need for them to forecast
future interest or wage rates.
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For this result we need two assumptions concerning household perceptions of
the government budget constraint. First, we assume that households under-
stand the flow budget constraint of the government (11). Second, households
believe that that government debt does not explode too fast, so that its (ex-
pected) limiting present value is zero. Thus we assume:
Assumption 2: Households’ forecasts (i) are consistent with the flow bud-
get constraint (11) and (ii) satisfy
lim
j→∞
¡
Det,t+j(t)
¢−1 bet+j+1(t) = 0.
Note that the flow budget constraint of the government is an accounting
relationship, whereas the intertemporal budget constraint in Assumption 2
is a subjective belief of the households about the government.
We now establish the result about the consumption function, which was
mentioned above:
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the consumption function (8) can
be written as
ct(1 + SeD(t)) = rtkt + PV et (w)− PV et (g). (13)
Proof. Since at ≡ kt + bt, to establish the result it is suﬃcient to show that
rtbt + PV et (g) = PV et (τ). (14)
Substituting recursively (11) forward,
0 = rtbt + (gt − τ t) +
J−1X
j=1
D−1t,t+j(t)(gt+j − τ t+j)−D−1t,t+J−1(t)bt+J .
Using Assumption 2(i) we have
0 = rtbt+(gt−τ t)+
J−1X
j=1
¡
Det,t+j(t)
¢−1
(get+j(t)−τ et+j(t))−
¡
Det,t+J−1(t)
¢−1 bet+J(t),
(15)
and using Assumption 2(ii) it follows that
0 = rtbt + (gt − τ t) +
∞X
j=1
¡
Det,t+j(t)
¢−1
(get+j(t)− τ et+j(t)),
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which is (14).
It follows from Lemma 1 that the temporary equilibrium of the econ-
omy can equivalently be defined in terms of the model equations, the pre-
determined variables, and the expectations of interest rates, wages and gov-
ernment spending
©
get+j(t)
ª∞
j=1 , rather than taxes {τ et+j(t)}∞j=1. An impli-
cation of the Lemma is that with some additional assumptions, Ricardian
Equivalence holds in the temporary equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume that neither gt nor
©
ret+j(t), wet+j(t), get+j(t)
ª∞
j=1 de-
pend on current government financing variables τ t and bt+1. Then Ricardian
Equivalence holds in the temporary equilibrium at time t, i.e. ct is indepen-
dent of τ t and bt+1.
According to Proposition 2, given pre-determined variables and expec-
tations about the future, we have Ricardian Equivalence in the temporary
equilibrium. A crucial assumption is that expectations do not react within
the period to taxes. If, for example, an increase in taxes τ t leads agents to
revise upward their expectations of future government spending, then we no
longer have Ricardian Equivalence even in the temporary equilibrium at time
t.7
Next, we distinguish Ricardian Equivalence in the temporary equilibrium
at a single moment of time from the stronger notion of Ricardian Equivalence
for the entire path of temporary equilibria with learning. The latter also
depends on the way in which expectations are revised over time, as we now
discuss.
3 Ricardian Equivalence for Paths of Tempo-
rary Equilibria with Learning
In considering the evolution of the economy over time we use the temporary
equilibrium approach that is standard in the adaptive learning literature, and
which has antecedents in Hicks (1946), Parts III and IV, and Grandmont
(1982). For a discussion see Radner (1982). In the context of infinite-horizon
agents solving dynamic optimization problems, our approach can be viewed
7It appears to be this type of concern that is discussed, for instance, on p. 3 in Feldstein
(1982).
9
as a version of the “anticipated utility” approach formulated by Kreps (1998)
and discussed in Sargent (1999), and Cogley and Sargent (2008).
At each time t agents solve their dynamic optimization problem, given
forecasts of the future based on an estimated forecasting model, and use the
solution to make their time t decisions. At time t + 1 agents update their
forecasting model and their forecasts of future variables, and re-solve their
dynamic optimization problem in order to make their time t + 1 decisions.
In the anticipated utility approach recommended by Kreps, agents update
their forecasts over time but do not take into account the fact that their
forecasting model will be revised in future periods. Clearly this is a bounded
rationality approach, since a full Bayesian approach would recognize the un-
certainty in the parameters of the estimated forecasting model. However, as
noted by Cogley and Sargent (2008), a full Bayesian approach in macroeco-
nomic settings is typically “too complicated to be implemented,” and thus
the anticipated utility approach is an appealing implementation of bounded
rationality.8
Consider, therefore, the path of temporary equilibria in a Ramsey econ-
omy that starts with some initial capital stock k0, public debt b0 and be-
liefs about the future path of the economy. When agents are learning, the
economy evolves along a path of temporary equilibria {ct, kt+1, rt+1, wt+1,
bt+1}∞t=0 for given fiscal policy rules that determine {(gt, τ t)}∞t=0 and debt dy-
namics satisfying our assumptions.9 In the preceding section it was shown
that under Assumptions 1 and 2, the consumption function (13) depends on
expectations
©
ret+j(t), wet+j(t), get+j(t)
ª∞
j=1. In some of the examples below,
gt is an exogenous sequence, while in others it is determined by a fiscal rule.
In the latter case, we assume that consumers use the rule to forecast future
government spending, in line with Assumption 2.
Ricardian Equivalence under RE requires that government spending does
not depend on taxes or debt, and this assumption is also needed for Ricardian
Equivalence along learning paths. We therefore assume:
Assumption 3: Government spending gt either is exogenous or is a pre-
determined variable that depends only on {ks, rs, ws, gs−1}ts=0.
8Furthermore, Cogley and Sargent (2008) show that the anticipated utility approach
often provides an excellent approximation to Bayesian decisions.
9We make additional assumptions below on the policy rule determining gt.
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Next, we formulate the assumptions about expectations formation and
learning, which leads to the main result: the conditions under which Ri-
cardian Equivalence holds for whole sequence of temporary equilibria, t =
0, 1, 2, . . .. We first define the concept of a learning mechanism and make an
assumption about the associated information set.
Definition: An adaptive learning mechanism is a mapping from the time t
information set It to the sequence of expectations
©
ret+j(t), wet+j(t), get+j(t)
ª∞
j=1,
for t ≥ 0, together with an initial set of expectations
©
rej(−1), wej(−1), gej (−1)
ª∞
j=0.
Assumption 4: The information set at t ≥ 0 for the adaptive learning
mechanism consists of
It = {ks, rs, ws, gs}ts=0 ∪
©{res+j(s), wes+j(s), ges+j(s)}∞j=1ªt−1s=−1 .
It would be possible to allow It to include a dependence on lagged consump-
tion, but it is crucial that It does not include current or past values of taxes
or debt.
Our formulation in terms of an adaptive learning mechanism for how
expectations are updated over time is very general and includes various stan-
dard statistical forecasting rules as special cases. Examples include forecasts
based on sample means, exponentially-weighted moving averages (“adaptive
expectations”) or models using parameters estimated by least-squares or sim-
ilar methods. We keep the formulation general in order to isolate the specific
assumptions required for our results.
Given k0 (and hence r0, w0), b0, g−1 and initial expectations {rej(−1),
wej(−1), gej (−1)}∞j=0, a path of (temporary) equilibria with learning is a se-
quence {ct, gt+1, kt+1, rt+1, wt+1, bt+1}∞t=0 in which expectations {ret+j(t),
wet+j(t), get+j(t)}∞j=1 at each time t satisfy an adaptive learning mechanism
and in which the temporary equilibrium equations (9)-(13) and the govern-
ment fiscal policy rules are satisfied.
Definition: The model exhibits Ricardian Equivalence if, for all initial
conditions, the sequence of variables {ct, kt+1, rt+1, wt+1}∞t=0 along the path
of equilibria with learning is independent of the government financing policy.
The key result of the paper is:
Theorem 3 The Ramsey model exhibits Ricardian Equivalence under As-
sumptions 1 through 4.
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Proof. The result is shown using induction on t. By Assumptions 3 and 4,
g0 and
©
rej(0), wej(0), gej (0)
ª∞
j=1 are independent of the government financing
policy. It then follows from Proposition 2 that the consumption function
satisfies Ricardian Equivalence. Thus c0 and (k1, r1, w1) are independent
of the financing policy of the government. Suppose now for some t ≥ 1
that (cs−1, ks, rs, ws) and
©
res−1+j(s− 1), wes−1+j(s− 1), ges−1+j(s− 1)
ª∞
j=1, for
s = 1, . . . , t, are independent of the government financing policy. Then by
Assumptions 3 and 4, and Proposition 2,
©
ret+j(t), wet+j(t), get+j(t)
ª∞
j=1 , ct, gt
and hence (kt+1, rt+1, wt+1) are independent of the financing policy. It fol-
lows by induction that {ct, kt+1, rt+1, wt+1}∞t=0 is independent of the financing
policy.
The theorem makes it very clear that rational expectations is not required
for validity of the Ricardian proposition. If one makes assumptions on the
economy guaranteeing Ricardian Equivalence under RE, then the equivalence
also holds under learning given Assumptions 1-4. The essential ingredients
are that agents are dynamic optimizers and they understand the structure of
the government flow budget constraints and believe that the intertemporal
budget constraint will hold. The other essential ingredient is that agents’
expectations do not depend on government financing variables.
4 Examples
We now develop several examples that highlight the role of diﬀerent assump-
tions behind the results. In each example we assume that the government
spending and tax policies are known. Assumptions 1 and 2 are assumed sat-
isfied throughout, so that the consumption function is given by equation (13)
of Lemma 1.10 Assumption 3 is satisfied if government spending is exoge-
nous.11 Example 1 illustrates Ricardian Equivalence under learning in this
case.
10Actually, in our examples Assumptions 1 and 2(i) are suﬃcient to imply (13), since
for these examples iteration of the flow government budget constraint over a finite horizon
is suﬃcient to establish (14).
11Bohn (1992) has shown that under RE Ricardian equivalence fails if government spend-
ing is determined as optimal welfare maximizing policy (or in a public choice setting).
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4.1 Example with exogenous government spending
Example 1 : (exogenous government spending). Suppose government spend-
ing is exogenous and constant at the level g¯. The initial level of government
debt is assumed to be b0 = 0. Under balanced budget financing τ t = gt = g¯
for all t, and bt = 0 each period. We consider an alternative financing policy
in which taxes are held below g¯ for T periods, after which debt is stabilized.
gt = g¯,
τ t =
½
τ¯ < g¯ for 0 ≤ t < T
g¯ + (rt − 1)bT for t ≥ T
.
Note that after period T taxes are raised to levels that covers permanent
government spending plus (net) interest payment on public debt. It is easily
verified that bt > 0 for t ≥ 1, and that bt = bT for all t > T . Thus as long
as ret+j(t) are bounded above one, we have limj→∞
¡
Det,t+j(t)
¢−1 bet+j+1(t) = 0
and also PVt(g) and PVt(τ) are finite.
For the adaptive learning mechanism it is assumed that in forecasting
wages and interest rates agents use the simple adaptive expectations rules
ret+i(t) = re(t) where re(t) = re(t− 1) + γ(rt − re(t− 1)) and (16)
wet+i(t) = we(t) where we(t) = we(t− 1) + γ(wt − we(t− 1)), (17)
for all i = 1, 2, ... and for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In the learning literature these
are also called steady-state adaptive learning rules with constant gain, where
0 < γ ≤ 1 is the “gain” parameter that controls how much expectations
adjust to forecast errors.12 With these adaptive learning mechanisms agents
estimate and forecast the future values of the interest rate and wages under
the assumption that the perceived time profile is flat.13
We remark that more generally agents’ forecasts of future values of rt
and wt might depend on the capital stock in view of equations (9) and (10).
In stochastic settings this dependence can be estimated using least-squares
12Constant-gain learning means that past data is discounted exponentially. Traditional
least-squares learning corresponds to decreasing gain γt = 1/t and in this case all data
receive an equal weight. The results for decreasing gain would be similar, provided agents
have been learning for a long period, so that the gain is “small” when the policy change
is announced.
13Adaptive learning rules that yield a time-varying profile for expected future inter-
est rates are straightforward to develop, e.g. see Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009),
Section 4.
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adaptive learning rules. However, as the current setting is nonstochastic, it
is not advisable for agents to estimate both intercept and slope parameters
in regression relations because of emerging perfect multicollinearity as the
economy converges to the steady state.14 In our examples below, the adaptive
learning rules (16)-(17) converge over time to perfect foresight.
If the economy begins in a steady state at t = 0, i.e. k0 = k¯, r0 = r¯ ≡
1− δ + f 0(k¯), and w0 = w¯ ≡ f(k¯)− k¯f 0(k¯) (see the Appendix for the steady
state values and computation of RE dynamics), then under RE, kt = k¯ for
all t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., and of course under RE this holds regardless of whether
the budget is balanced in every period, or deficit financing is used.
More generally, initial conditions for the economy are given by k0 and b0
and, in the case of learning, initial expectations re(−1) and we(−1). Unless
all initial conditions correspond to the steady state, the path of temporary
equilibria with learning will diﬀer from the RE path. Nevertheless, by The-
orem 3 of the previous section, Ricardian Equivalence holds under learning
even when the divergence from the RE path is potentially large.
We illustrate this point numerically.15 The parameter values chosen are
σ = 1, β = 0.99, δ = 0.03, α = 1/3, g¯ = 0.4, τ¯ = 0.3, T = 20, and γ = 1/20
in the learning rule.
Figure 1 plots the dynamics of consumption and capital under learning
and RE when the initial capital stock k0 is perturbed by 5% from its steady
state value, i.e., we set k0 = 1.05k¯ with the corresponding initial market clear-
ing interest rates and wage rates r0 = 1−δ+f 0(k0) and w0 = f(k0)−k0f 0(k0)
accordingly perturbed via the equations (10) and (9). Under learning, the
initial interest rate and wage rate expectations are set equal to these latter
values, i.e., re(−1) = r0 and we(−1) = w0, which under our learning rule
implies also that re(0) = r0 and we(0) = w0. The solid line in the figures
depict the paths of equilibria with learning (under both balanced budget and
deficit financing since there is Ricardian Equivalence under learning), while
the dashed line denotes the RE paths.
As is obvious from the figure, the diﬀerences between the learning path
and the RE path are substantial. The dynamics under RE follow the stan-
dard saddle-path solution, i.e., starting from above, capital and consumption
decline monotonically to their steady-state values. Under learning, because
14See Evans and Honkapohja (1998) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), pp. 152-154, for
a discussion of the subtle diﬀerences of learning in deterministic and stochastic settings.
15The Appendix provides further details for computing the learning path. The Mathe-
matica routines for the numerical results are available on request.
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the expected interest-rate profile initially lies below the RE path, consump-
tion is higher under learning and the capital-stock declines more quickly than
under RE. This leads to cyclical over-shooting under learning, with eventual
convergence to the steady state as expectational errors are corrected. The
convergent cyclical dynamics under learning appears robust to changes in
parameter values.
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Figure 1: Paths of consumption (left-hand figure) and capital (right-hand
figure) under learning (solid line) and RE (dashed line) when initial capital
is above the steady state in Example 1.
Figure 2 plots the dynamics of debt under learning and under RE for
the case where there is deficit financing and initial public debt is set at
zero. There are diﬀerences in debt dynamics under learning and RE that
are driven by the diﬀerences in the interest rates along the two paths. In
the numerical illustration the two debt levels are plotted from period 15 to
25. We have omitted the initial periods in which debt under learning is also
higher but the diﬀerences are very small since the initial debt is assumed to
be zero. These diﬀerences would be magnified if the initial debt level were
substantially above zero.
In this numerical example, the capital stock under learning initially falls
below the RE path for a substantial length of time, which implies that the
interest rate under RE is lower than under learning during these periods.
This leads to a higher path and permanent level of public debt under learning
than under RE. However, despite the diﬀerences in the paths of the economy
under learning and RE there is Ricardian Equivalence in both cases, i.e.
the consumption and capital paths under deficit finance are identical to the
corresponding paths with balanced budgets.
15
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Figure 2: Paths of debt under RE (dashed line) and under learning (solid
line) under deficit financing in Example 1.
4.2 Examples with endogenous government spending
It is known that if government spending is endogenous then Ricardian Equiv-
alence can fail under rational expectations and therefore also under learning.
As a simple example, we briefly consider the following.
Example 2: (endogenous government spending). Assume b0 = 0. Under
balanced budget financing gt = τ t = g¯ for all t, while under deficit financing
gt =
½
g¯ for 0 ≤ t < T
g¯ − (rt − 1)bT for t ≥ T
τ t =
½
τ¯ < g¯ for 0 ≤ t < T
g¯ for t ≥ T .
Thus, after period T government spending is reduced by an amount equal to
(net) interest payment on public debt. Again it is easily verified that bt > 0
for t ≥ 1, and that bt = bT for all t > T .
This fiscal rule violates our Assumption 3 and it can easily be verified
that we do not have Ricardian Equivalence either under RE or learning. The
failure arises from the endogeneity of government spending which here is the
result of a mechanical rule in contrast to the model of Bohn (1992), which
focuses on consequences of optimizing government behavior.
However, it is also possible to construct variations of this example in which
Ricardian Equivalence holds under RE but not under learning. Consider the
16
following fiscal rule in which the failure of Ricardian Equivalence arises if
expectations deviate from RE and government spending is used to partly
reconcile the out-of-equilibrium budget deficits. For simplicity, it is now
assumed that the economy is initially in the steady state, i.e. k0 = k¯. We
continue to assume b0 = 0.
Example 3: (potentially endogenous government spending). Under bal-
anced budget financing gt = τ t = g¯ and bt = 0. We now assume that under
deficit financing
gt =
½
g¯ for 0 ≤ t < T
g¯ + (β−1 − rt)bT for t ≥ T
τ t =
½
τ¯ < g¯ for 0 ≤ t < T
g¯ + (β−1 − 1)bT for t ≥ T
.
Under deficit financing, debt is again stabilized at the level bT for t > T .
Example 3 diﬀers from Example 1 in that after period T taxes are at
a level that pays for the permanent level of government spending and the
steady-state interest on public debt while under learning any deviation be-
tween the steady-state and actual interest rates on debt is paid for by a
corresponding adjustment in the level of government spending. Thus, gov-
ernment spending is potentially endogenous in Example 3.16
In Figure 3, paths of temporary equilibria with learning in regimes of
deficit- and balanced-budget financing are illustrated numerically for the
fiscal regime of Example 3. We again use the learning rules (16)-(17).
Wage expectations are assumed to be initially at their steady state value
we(−1) = we(0) = w¯, while interest rate expectations are initially above
the steady state value by one percentage point, i.e. re(−1) is set so that
re(0) = 1.01r0. We set the following numerical parameter values for these
figures: σ = 1, β = 0.95, δ = 0.1, α = 1/3, g¯ = 0.4, τ¯ = 0.3, T = 20, and
γ = 1/40 in the learning rule. As τ¯ < g¯, we have debt financing shown by
the thick solid curves. The learning paths of consumption and capital under
balanced budget (τ¯ = g¯) are shown by the thin solid curves. For reference,
the RE path, which is a steady state in this numerical case, is shown as the
dashed line.
16This endogeneity is the source of the deviation from Ricardian Equivalence found in
Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).
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Figure 3: Paths of consumption (left-hand figure) and capital (right-hand
figure) for learning under deficit financing (solid line) and under balanced
budget (thin line) when government spending is endogenous. The
horizontal dashed line shows the RE steady-state path.
Figure 3 illustrates that under learning Ricardian Equivalence fails for
this fiscal regime even though Ricardian Equivalence holds under RE.17 The
reason for failure of Ricardian Equivalence under learning stems from the
assumed endogeneity of government spending with respect to the interest
rate and the positive level of debt. Along the learning path the interest
rate for t ≥ T deviates from its steady state value, leading to a change in
government spending.
It is seen that for our numerical example the fluctuations of consumption
and capital under learning are smaller with deficit financing than under bal-
anced budgets. This result appears robust, though the magnitude of these
diﬀerences is sensitive to the parameter values in the model.18 Intuitively,
under both balanced budget and deficit financing, the initially high re(t)
reduces consumption, leading to an investment boom and to high levels of
capital stock and low actual interest rates near period T = 20. However,
beginning in period T = 20, under deficit-financing the resulting low actual
17In this example, for simplicity, the economy is assumed to be initially at the steady
state with rt = β−1, so that under RE there is no change in government spending. Under
the specified fiscal rule Ricardian Equivalence would fail under RE for non-steady state
initial capital stocks, but a suitable modification of the tax and spending rules would
preserve Ricardian Equivalence along a (non-steady-state) RE path.
18In other simulations, which are not shown, approximate Ricardian Equivalence is found
to hold under learning when β is close to one and δ close to zero. This last result is similar
to what was found for a model without capital in Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009).
On the other hand, smaller choices of the gain parameter γ can lead to substantially larger
diﬀerences between the balanced budget and deficit financing cases under learning.
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interest rates leads to higher gt under our fiscal rule, which crowds out in-
vestment. This endogenous fiscal mechanism reduces the magnitude of the
fluctuations in capital and consumption; this is also reflected in less volatile
fluctuations in wage and interest-rate expectations under deficit financing.
4.3 Example when learning rule depends on debt
So far we have considered learning rules for wages and interest rates that do
not depend on current or past levels of debt or taxes. We now show that this
is crucial for the Ricardian result to hold under learning.
Example 4 : (expectations depend on debt) Suppose now that interest
rate expectations depend on changes in the level of public debt, so that
re(t) = re(t− 1) + γ(rt − re(t− 1)) + η(bt − bt−1). (18)
Government spending and taxation follow the fiscal rule of Example 1. In
particular, the government spending sequence is exogenous.
We now consider the departures in the learning paths under balanced
budget and deficit financing when agents use the learning rule (18). η > 0
implies that agents believe the interest rate will go up when debt is increasing,
while η = 0 gives our baseline learning rule (16). The case of η > 0 can be
viewed as reflecting the belief that rising levels of public debt may lead to
higher future real interest rates. Indeed, this is currently an issue of active
discussion in policy circles, and thus this type of expectation formation may
well be plausible, even if it is not fully rational.
Figure 4 illustrates the deviations between the paths under learning. The
same parameter values are used as in Figure 1, i.e., σ = 1, β = 0.99, δ =
0.03, α = 1/3, g¯ = 0.4, τ¯ = 0.3, T = 20, and γ = 1/20. Initial conditions
are set at b0 = 0, k0 = k¯, re(−1) = r¯ and we(−1) = w¯ i.e. we start at
the steady state initially but let η = 0.002. The thick horizontal line depicts
the paths under RE and the learning path under balanced budget, while the
solid curve shows the learning path under deficit financing when interest rate
expectations depend on debt dynamics.
There are large diﬀerences in the two learning paths, which clearly illus-
trates the failure of Ricardian Equivalence when agents condition expecta-
tions on changes in debt levels in their learning rules. However, note that this
learning rule allows the economy to converge to the steady state eventually
19
since the level of debt stabilizes from period T onwards for this financing
rule.
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Figure 4: Paths of consumption (left-hand figure) and capital (right-hand
figure) under learning for deficit financing (solid curve) and balanced
budget (horizontal thick line) when the learning rule depends on debt.
4.4 Discussion
The results of this paper could be viewed in several ways. One possible reac-
tion would emphasize that we have shown Ricardian Equivalence to be more
general than previously recognized since we have shown that fully rational ex-
pectations are not required for its validity. Another possible reaction is that
Ricardian Equivalence is unlikely to hold in practice because the assumptions
we have provided for its validity are implausibly strong.
Our own view is that by reconsidering the issue without imposing perfect
foresight or fully rational expectations a priori, we have made explicit several
key hidden assumptions implicitly made when Ricardian Equivalence is ex-
amined under rational expectations. For example, under RE, if the standard
assumptions are made that gt is an exogenous process and that the intertem-
poral budget constraint of the government is satisfied, then Assumption 4 is
an implication of RE. By formulating the question under general expecta-
tions updating rules, we see that Assumptions 3 and 4 are logically separable,
and that these assumptions are in principle separately testable. Quantitative
studies of Ricardian Equivalence, such as Heathcote (2005), typically impose
RE as a restriction, and the results of the current paper open up another
possible channel for the failure of Ricardian Equivalence. As emphasized
in our Assumption 4, the crucial issue is not whether expectations are fully
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rational, but whether or not expectations of future interest rates and wages
depend on observed government financing variables.
In a similar vein, Assumption 2 makes explicit that for Ricardian equiva-
lence to hold, agents need to incorporate the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government into their forecasts. In their (local) analysis of monetary
and fiscal policy interaction in a New Keynesian setting, Eusepi and Preston
(2010b), who focus on the stability under least-squares learning of alterna-
tive policy regimes, treat the government’s intertemporal budget constraint
as an aspect of policymaker communication that facilitates stability. Our
analysis and examples make clear that, under the assumptions stated, Ricar-
dian Equivalence can hold even along transitional learning paths and with
expectations that are not close to RE (and even for expectations that do not
converge to RE asymptotically).
Finally, we emphasize that in stating the assumptions under which Ri-
cardian Equivalence holds even when expectations are not rational, we are
not claiming that Assumptions 1 through 4 are necessarily satisfied. This is
an empirical matter. It is also possible that the assumptions are satisfied in
certain countries and periods of time, even if they do not hold more generally.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that validity of the Ricardian Equivalence
proposition does not critically depend on the RE hypothesis. The Ricar-
dian result can continue to hold if agents are dynamic optimizers given their
subjective expectations and form their expectations using adaptive learning
rules in place of RE. The central reason for our result is that agents are
assumed to understand the government budget constraint and believe that
the government transversality condition holds when evaluated at their sub-
jective expectations. It is, however, crucial to assume that the learning rules
are based on an appropriately restricted set of information variables.
Two new reasons for failure of the Ricardian result were found when
expectations are formed using adaptive learning rules. One case is a fiscal
regime in which government spending under deficit finance becomes endoge-
nous solely as a result of dynamics that deviate from RE. A second reason for
failure of Ricardian Equivalence under learning arises if, under deficit finance,
agents condition their expectations on government’s financial variables (taxes
and debt).
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Our basic results for paths under learning were demonstrated under the
usual assumptions required for Ricardian Equivalence under RE. Our analysis
used the Ramsey model, which has been a standard framework for discussing
the Ricardian proposition. To make our point in a compelling way, we have
kept the analytical framework as simple as possible. We conjecture, however,
that it will be possible to generalize our results in several directions.
One natural extension would be to stochastic Ramsey (or RBC) models
that allow for exogenous stochastic shocks to productivity and government
spending. Linearized models can be used to obtain the consumption func-
tion, and, with observable shocks included in the information set, our class
of adaptive learning mechanisms would cover the least-squares learning rules
standard in the adaptive learning literature. This extension would raise the
possibility of further results in which Ricardian Equivalence may hold as-
ymptotically in some cases in which our assumptions are violated. Other
extensions include stochastic models with large shocks (in which lineariza-
tion may be a poor approximation), the use of Bayesian learning instead of
the anticipated utility framework, and the inclusion of distortionary taxes.19
Studying the implications of deficit financing versus balanced budget financ-
ing, when Ricardian Equivalence fails under learning, will also be of interest.
19Several of these topics are being examined in our current research.
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Appendix: Derivations and Proofs
A Details for RE dynamics
The steady state values of the various variables under RE for the Ramsey
model are given by
k¯ = (
β−1 + δ − 1
α
)
1
α−1 ,
y¯ = k¯α,
c¯ = k¯α − g¯ − δk¯,
r¯ = 1− δ + αk¯α−1 = β−1,
w¯ = (1− α)k¯α.
The RE dynamics are obtained by taking a linear approximation around
the steady state. For our purposes it is enough to analyze the balanced
budget case (τ¯ = g¯) due to Ricardian Equivalence. Employing the same
notation as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Section 11.7, we can write
φ0kt+2 + φ1kt+1 + φ2kt = A0 +A1gt +A2gt+1. (19)
The parameter values in our case take the form
φ0 = 1,
φ1 = −[α(k¯)α−1 + 2− δ −
βσ−1α(α− 1)(k¯)α−2[k¯α + (1− δ)k¯ − k¯ − g¯],
φ2 = β−1,
A0 = (1 + φ1 + φ2)k¯,
A1 = 1, A2 = −1.
Since gt = g¯ for all t, it is easy to show that the linearized capital dynamics
under RE reduce to
kt+1 = λ2kt −
1
λ1 − 1
A0,
where 0 < λ2 < 1 is the stable eigenvalue, and λ1 the unstable eigenvalue,
associated with the saddle-path RE solution to (19). Consumption is then
determined as a residual from the market clearing equation (12).
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B Examples with Learning and gt = g¯.
In Examples 1 and 4 we have constant government spending, i.e. gt = g¯ for
all t. Constant government spending also arises in Example 3 in the case of
balanced budgets. The consumption function is given by (13). Agents are
engaging in steady-state learning of interest rates and wages, given by (16)
and (17), with initial expectations given by re(−1) and we(−1). Under this
learning rule,
Det,t+j(t) =
jQ
i=1
re(t) = (re(t))j.
The needed present values are
PV et (g) = g¯ + g¯
∞X
j=1
(re(t))−j =
g¯
1− re(t)−1 ,
PV et (w) = wt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))−1wet+j(t) = wt + we(t)
∞X
j=1
(re(t))−j
= wt + we(t)
1
re(t)− 1 .
The consumption function (13) thus simplifies to
ct(1 + SeD(t)) = rtkt + wt + we(t)
1
re(t)− 1 −
g¯
1− re(t)−1 .
We also have the market clearing condition
kt+1 = f(kt)− ct − g¯ + (1− δ)kt.
This completes the description of the economy under learning and constant
government spending (Examples 1 and 4), for both balanced budget and
debt financing. These equations also hold for the balanced budget case of
Example 3.
C Details for Deficit Financing in Example 3
It is easily verified that b0 = 0 and bt+1 = bT for all t ≥ T . By Assumption
2(i), agents use the intertemporal budget constraint (15) of the government
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to compute beT (t) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2 (with t+ J = T ), i.e.,
0 = rtbt + (g¯ − τ¯) +
T−t−1X
j=1
¡
Det,t+j(t)
¢−1
(g¯ − τ¯)−
¡
Det,T−1(t)
¢−1 beT (t).
Solving for beT (t) and using Det,t+j(t) = (re(t))j yields
beT (t) = (re(t))T−t−1[rtbt + (g¯ − τ¯)
1− (re(t))−(T−t)
1− re(t)−1 ]. (20)
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2, we have
PV et (g) = gt +
∞X
j=1
(Det,t+j(t))−1get+j(t)
= g¯ + g¯
T−t−1X
j=1
(re(t))−j + {g¯ + (β−1 − re(t))beT (t)}(
∞X
j=T−t
(re(t))−j)
= g¯
1− (re(t))−(T−t)
1− re(t)−1 + {g¯ + (β
−1 − re(t))beT (t)}
(re(t))−(T−t)
1− re(t)−1 .
where beT (t) is given by (20).
For t = T − 1, we have
PV et (g) = g¯ + {g¯ + (β−1 − re(t))bT}
∞X
j=1
(re(t))−j
= g¯ + {g¯ + (re(t)− re(t))bT} (r
e(t))−1
1− re(t)−1
since beT (T − 1) is known at T − 1 i.e.
beT (T − 1) = bT = g¯ − τ¯ + rT−1bT−1.
Finally, for all t ≥ T,
PV et (g) = g¯ + (β
−1 − rt)bT + {g¯ + (β−1 − re(t))bT}
∞X
j=1
(re(t))−j
= g¯ + (β−1 − rt)bT + {g¯ + (β−1 − re(t))bT} (r
e(t))−1
1− re(t)−1 .
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